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The First Sale Doctrine and Foreign Sales: 
The Economic Implications in the United 
States Textbook Market 
Garry A. Gabison1 
15 U. MASS. L. REV. 166 
ABSTRACT 
This Article investigates the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision. After discussing the 
first sale doctrine, this Article presents the issues around implementing a worldwide 
first sale doctrine. International treaties attempt to ensure that authors can benefit 
from their work by affording them similar protections in different jurisdictions. But a 
worldwide first sale exhaustion limits the ability of copyright holders to profit from 
their work because it allows the author to compete with its own work that had been 
priced differently in different jurisdictions. Finally, this Article tests whether, in the 
United States, the price of textbooks has been affected by the Kirtsaeng decision and 
finds that the price of textbooks increased between 2001 and 2018 but not more 
rapidly or slowly after the decision. In other words, the decision may not have had 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like other property rights, copyright has been described as a 
bundle of rights.2 The copyright first sale doctrine takes away one stick 
from the bundle of rights. The first sale doctrine states that: “the owner 
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this 
title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell 
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”3 
What the rule against perpetuities does for real property,4 the first 
sale doctrine does for copyright. The first sale doctrine limits how a 
right holder controls a copyright-embodying work once it enters the 
stream of commerce. Courts have used this doctrine to remove 
uncertainties for purchasers of copyrighted goods.5 This doctrine 
harmonizes the rights of purchasers by limiting the rights of copyright 
holders. 
The first sale doctrine arose because right holders attempted to use 
copyrights to control how their copyright-embodying goods were 
traded. For example, copyright holders have attempted to control how 
their work can be priced6 or where their work can be sold.7 These 
copyright holders raised copyright claims to avoid contract privity 
 
2 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1985) 
(“Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the 
owner of the copyright. Under the Copyright Act, these rights—to publish, copy, 
and distribute the author’s work—vest in the author of an original work from the 
time of its creation.”). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008). 
4 See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 1 (3d ed. 
1915). John Chipman Gray describes the rule against perpetuities as one of the 
“transfers of rights in their nature alienable the law forbids” and as a limitation 
“beyond which future interests cannot be created.” Id. 
5 See generally Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR 
Licensing: Contracting Around “First Sale” in Multilevel Production Settings, 
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1149, 1155–56 (2011) (“[T]he original rationale for 
the first sale doctrine [is]: an increased certainty over the ‘price’ of a good, 
arising when limits are placed on the parties that can be charged licensing fees. 
If an end purchaser of a good has no reasonable way of knowing whether the 
good comes with unseen obligations, such as licensing fees on the components 
that form the inputs of the good, then uncertainty will hinder the exchange of 
goods and the dissemination of the innovations underlying those goods.”). 
6 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908). 
7 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 525–26 (2013). 
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requirements and antitrust liability.8 In response, the Supreme Court 
created the first sale doctrine to rein in the copyright holders’ business 
methods.9 
Copyright holders have tested the limits of the first sale doctrine. 
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, a book publisher argued that 
copyright granted its holder the power to price differently based on the 
location where each copyright-embodied work was sold.10 The 
Supreme Court disagreed and instead expanded the reach of the U.S. 
first sale doctrine. 
This Article first discusses the law and economics behind the first 
sale doctrine and the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision on the U.S. 
textbook market. Section II provides an overview of the origin of the 
first sale doctrine. It also discusses the overlay with international 
copyright treaties. Section III discusses the law and economics of the 
first sale doctrine and how copyright holders would geographically 
price discriminate without such a doctrine. Price discrimination has 
theoretical ambiguous effects on price and consumer welfare. Thus, 
welfare analysis cannot support or disprove the efficiency of the first 
sale doctrine. Section IV empirically measures the impact of the 
Kirtsaeng decision on the price of textbooks in the U.S. The first sale 
doctrine made price discrimination more difficult to implement. 
Publishers cannot prevent arbitrage11 between low-price countries and 
the high-price U.S. anymore. Nonetheless, the decision has had no 
impact on the pricing behavior of textbooks in the U.S. 
II. COPYRIGHT, FIRST SALE DOCTRINE, AND FOREIGN SALES 
Even before it was adopted by Congress, the first sale doctrine had 
a long common law history.12 This section discusses the Supreme 
 
8 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 487 (2011) 
(discussing the relationship between first sale doctrine and contractual 
relationship as well as antitrust scrutiny). 
9 See id. Hovenkamp questions the necessity of the doctrine when antitrust laws 
can be used to limit copyright in the same way as the first sale doctrine does. Id. 
at 503–04. 
10 568 U.S. at 525. 
11 Arbitrage is “[t]he simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in another of a 
security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the 
different markets.” Arbitrage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
12 Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538. 
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Court’s jurisprudence of the doctrine. This section then addresses how 
international treaties affect the first sale doctrine. Finally, it examines 
the public policy implications of the first sale doctrine and of the 
Kirtsaeng ruling. 
 
A. A Brief History of the First Sale Doctrine 
The first sale doctrine has a long history. Justice Breyer traces it to 
1628 England: “In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the 
common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of 
chattels . . . . A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale 
or other disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly ‘against Trade 
and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.’”13 
The U.S. version of the first sale doctrine is more recent. The 
doctrine was first discussed by the Supreme Court in 1908 in Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus14 and arose out of common law.15 
In Bobbs-Merrill, the copyright holder attempted to impose a 
resale price maintenance—which occurs when an upstream supplier 
agrees or requires that the supplied good be sold at a specific price to a 
downstream retailer.16 The defendant, Macy’s department store, 
decided to undercut this price.17 The plaintiff argued that a copyright 
holder only grants a license to a retailer and under this license, the 
copyright holder is able to control the price at which the retailer could 
sell the product to consumers.18 
At that time, the Court had not yet made resale price maintenance 
per se illegal,19 which made the Bobbs-Merrill ruling all the more 
important. In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court ruled that: 
 
13 Id. at 538–39 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360 (1628)). 
14 210 U.S. 339, 343 (1908). 
15 Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538. 
16 210 U.S. at 341. 
17 Id. at 342. 
18 Id. at 343. 
19 In 1911, the Supreme Court made resale price maintenances per se illegal. Dr. 
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408–09 (1911). It 
remained per se illegal until 2007 when the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles 
Medical. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900 
(2007). In other words, it took three years for the Supreme Court to extend the 
bar on resale price maintenance, as articulated in Bobbs-Merrill, for copyright 
products to all products. Resale price maintenance aimed at decreasing the intra-
brand competition and encouraging inter-brand competition. Contrary to what 
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In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of 
the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not 
create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this 
case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future 
purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.20 
The Court thus limited the control that copyright holders had over their 
copyrighted works once put into the stream of commerce. The Court 
feared that without such a rule the copyright holder would be able to 
dictate and limit what would happen to its copyright-embodying 
products.21 
The following year, Congress codified the doctrine in the 
Copyright Act of 1909.22 The Act specified that “the copyright is 
distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted”23 and 
that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict 
the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which 
has been lawfully obtained.”24 
The current version was modified by the Copyright Act of 1976.25 
It specifies that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully 
made . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”26 
 
B. The First Sale Doctrine and International Trade 
The first sale doctrine has so far dealt with nationally traded 
copyrighted works. However, these works are also traded across the 
globe. It was not until ninety years after creating the first sale doctrine 
 
Hovenkamp advocates, the antitrust laws may not be a save-all panacea—even if 
the copyright holder implemented anticompetitive behaviors. See Hovenkamp, 
supra note 8, at 487. 
20 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350. 
21 Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998) (“The 
whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a 
copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his 
exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”). 
22 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 33 Stat. 1075, amended by 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–810 (1976)). 
23 Id. at § 41. 
24 Id. 
25 Copyright Act of 1976 § 109 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer 
of particular copy or phonorecord). 
26 Id. at § 109(a). 
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that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the international trade of 
copyrighted works. Until then, the question remained open whether 
copyright holders could control the distribution of copyrighted 
products imported to the U.S. 
In 1998, the Supreme Court investigated this question in Quality 
King Distributors v. L’anza Research International, where the Court 
decided whether the first sale doctrine applied to imported copies.27 In 
Quality King, the plaintiff, L’anza, was a manufacturer of hair care 
products.28 The products had copyrighted labels attached to them and 
L’anza enforced a territorial restriction on the product.29 One or 
multiple shipments aimed for the European market made their way 
into the U.S. stream of commerce.30 L’anza argued that, as a copyright 
holder, it could bar the entry of such products into the U.S. because the 
“importation and subsequent distribution of those products bearing 
copyrighted labels violated L’anza’s ‘exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106, 501 and 602 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted 
material in the United States.’”31 The District Court, Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court all rejected this argument 
under the first sale doctrine.32 
The Supreme Court highlighted an important distinction: this case 
did not involve copyright piracy.33 The copyright holder “does not 
claim that anyone has made unauthorized copies of its copyrighted 
labels. Instead, [the copyright holder] is primarily interested in 
protecting the integrity of its method of marketing the products to 
which the labels are affixed.”34 Much like in previous cases, the 
plaintiff attempted to use copyright to circumvent issues of contract 
privity.35 
 
27 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 138–39. 
30 Id. at 139. 
31 Id. at 139–40. 
32 Id. at 140, 152, 154. 
33 Id. at 146–48. 
34 Id. at 140. 
35 Id. at 143. The copyright holder advanced that “contractual provisions are 
inadequate to protect it from the actions of foreign distributors who may resell 
[the copyright holder’s] products to American vendors unable to buy from [its] 
domestic distributors.” Id. 
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This argument did not move the Supreme Court. The Court ruled 
that § 602 does not prohibit the importation of copyrighted material;36 
§ 106 grants the copyright holder the exclusive right to distribute 
copies;37 and § 109 authorizes the resale of legally purchased copies—
including to another person in another country.38 The Court expanded 
the first sale doctrine to protect subsequent purchasers from an 
infringement liability standpoint: “whether [they purchased] from a 
domestic or from a foreign reseller, [they are] obviously an ‘owner’ of 
that item.”39 
Comments from the majority and concurring opinions left some 
doubts about the reach of the first sale doctrine. The majority opinion 
referred to trademark but refused to make the parallel with the “gray 
market.”40 Justice Ginsburg stated that “[t]his case involves a ‘round 
trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to 
places abroad, then back again . . . . [W]e do not today resolve cases in 
which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad.”41 
Commentators worry that the Quality King ruling meant that the first 
sale doctrine would treat goods manufactured home and abroad 
differently.42 
The Supreme Court returned to this open question fifteen years 
later. In Kirtsaeng, the defendant was a Thai college student who 
moved to the U.S. to study mathematics.43 During his studies, he asked 
his family to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and ship them to him 
in the United States as the books were cheaper in Thailand.44 After 
 
36 Id. at 146–51. The Supreme Court held that § 602 prohibits the importation of 
copyrighted copies and does not extend to “copies that are lawfully made under 
the law of another country.” Id. at 148. As such, it would not apply since the 
good was manufactured in the U.S. 
37 Id. at 144. The Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to the 
rights granted under § 106. Id. at 150. 
38 Id. at 152. 
39 Id. at 145, 152–53. 
40 Id. at 153. 
41 Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
42 Michael Stockalper, Case Note and Comment, Is There a Foreign “Right” of 
Price Discrimination Under United States Copyright Law? An Examination of 
the First-Sale Doctrine as Applied to Gray-Market Goods, 20 DEPAUL J. ART 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 513, 514–15 (2010). 
43 568 U.S. 519, 527 (2013). 
44 Id. 
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using them, he was able to resell them in the U.S. for a profit.45 A 
publisher of such textbooks filed a suit for copyright infringement and 
illegal importation of copyrighted products.46 The defendant argued 
that the material was lawfully manufactured and purchased.47 He also 
argued that the copyright holder authorized the production and sale of 
these books in Thailand.48 As such, he invoked the first sale doctrine.49 
The Court discussed whether “[the] ‘first sale’ doctrine applies 
only to ‘the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this 
title.’”50 The Court distinguished Kirtsaeng from Quality King. In 
Quality King, the goods made a round trip and as such were made 
under the U.S. copyright title whereas, in Kirtsaeng, the goods were 
made abroad.51 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the first sale 
doctrine had geographical boundaries, and it held that the first sale 
doctrine should be interpreted non-geographically.52 
The Supreme Court stepped away from a literal interpretation of 
“lawfully made under this title” because it would make the first sale 
doctrine unworkable.53 The Kirtsaeng textbook was legally made and 
purchased abroad so it should be allowed to move within the stream of 
commerce without constraints.54 Any other interpretation would grant 
a copyright holder more power over foreign-manufactured books, as 
compared to locally-manufactured books.55 
The Quality King and Kirtsaeng rulings have the potential to 
impact the price of copyrighted products in the U.S. and abroad. The 
next section discusses that impact as well as copyright treaties and 
how the treaties can influence the U.S. ruling and interpretation of the 
first sale doctrine. 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 525, 527. 
47 Id. at 527. 
48 Id. at 529–30. 
49 Id. at 527, 530. 
50 Id. at 528 (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 218–19 (2d 
Cir. 2011)). 
51 Id. at 525. 
52 Id. at 529–30. 
53 Id. at 530–31. 
54 Id. at 533. 
55 Id. 
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C. The First Sale Doctrine and International Treaties 
The Court distinguished between copyrighted products 
manufactured in the U.S. (Quality King) and those manufactured 
abroad (Kirtsaeng). In reality, the ideas and embodiment of the 
copyrighted works remained the same, regardless of where they were 
produced. In both, the copyrighted goods targeted foreign markets. 
They were sold at lower prices as compared to the home market. So, 
the impact on the copyright holder would be the same regardless of 
where the copyrighted good was manufactured. In Kirtsaeng, Justice 
Kagan’s concurrence points to this problem: both should be treated the 
same.56 
In Kirtsaeng, Justice Ginsburg disagreed. She wrote in her dissent 
that the majority had applied the first sale doctrine to “copies that were 
‘lawfully made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but 
instead, under the law of some other country.”57 She argued that 
Congress had not intended for such a reading but instead intended for 
the first sale doctrine to apply to domestic made copies, not foreign 
manufactured copies of copyrighted works.58 
The Justices disagreed about the same principle as it applied to a 
different proxy. Copyright laws aim at promoting progress in the 
arts.59 Without being able to profit, authors may be less inclined to 
write, and the arts may not progress. Therefore, the first sale doctrine 
should apply when an author has been able to benefit from its labor—
regardless of the amount profited.60 
 
56 Id. at 555–57 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
57 Id. at 559–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Quality King Distribs. v. 
L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 147 (1998)). 
58 Id. at 561–64. 
59 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
60 Justice Ginsburg made the comparison between the first sale doctrine and its 
parallel in the patent system, the patent exhaustion doctrine. In Impression 
Products v. Lexmark International, she argues that because patent protection is 
territorial, as compared to copyright where countries harmonize their protection, 
then the patent exhaustion doctrine should not extend to patent-embodying 
products made outside the U.S. 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an in-depth discussion of the 
patent exhaustion doctrine, see Garry A. Gabison, Worldwide FRAND Licensing 
Standard, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 139, 154–62 (2019). 
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Authors can profit from exploiting their rights in foreign countries 
because these countries afford comparable copyright protections. The 
U.S. Copyright Act reflects the copyright treaties that the U.S. has 
joined.61 The U.S. is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) and 
the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”). In total, 176 other 
countries are signatory to the Berne Convention62 and 101 other 
countries are signatory to the UCC.63 
The Berne Convention was adopted in Berne, Switzerland in 1886 
and later amended in 1979.64 The U.S. passed the Berne Convention in 
198865 and the Convention entered into force in 1989.66 The Berne 
Convention aimed at removing formalities for foreign works to obtain 
copyright protection.67 The UCC was adopted in Geneva in 1952.68 
 
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
62 As of February 13, 2020, 177 countries were signatories to the Berne 
Convention. Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 
[https://perma.cc/FG93-2UV2]. 
63 As of February 13, 2020, 102 countries were signatories to the UCC. 




64 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ [https://perma.cc
/YLZ8-YV4A]. 
65 Treaties and Contracting Parties, United States of America, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1045C            
[https://perma.cc/7WFX-9HAM]. 
66 “The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 
September 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. Appearing within 
parentheses is the latest Act of the Convention to which the listed country is 
party. The Berne Convention, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended 
on October 2, 1979, did not enter into force with respect to the United States 
until March 1, 1989.” 17 U.S.C. § 104 note (2020) (Key to Symbols: Treaties 
and Conventions: Berne). 
67 Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010), 
abrogated by Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 139 S. Ct. 
881 (2019). 
68 World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, Schedules II to IV, 
WIPO LEX, https://wipolex.wipo.int/zh/text/125542 [https://perma.cc/GN34-
BEYB]. 
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The U.S. ratified the UCC in 1954 and it came into force in 1955.69 
The UCC attempted to accommodate for countries who disagreed with 
the Berne Convention.70 
These treaties attempt to harmonize copyright protection. Since 
these signatory countries afford copyright holders similar protections, 
“under this title” could be read narrowly or broadly. A narrow reading 
implies that protection of copyright extends only to works made under 
the U.S. Copyright Act (i.e., in the U.S.). A broad reading implies that 
the protection applies to works made under comparable foreign laws 
that arose out of the same treaty. In other words, the merger of the U.S. 
copyright law with other treaties would imply the merger of other 
principles or doctrines and the first sale doctrine should subsequently 
be harmonized as well. 
Harmonization can take two forms. Each jurisdiction could 
construe its first sale doctrine as stopping at its border. The doctrine 
would specify that any product manufactured and sold within a given 
jurisdiction could be resold without the consent of the right holder 
within that jurisdiction but not beyond. Alternatively, the first sale 
doctrine could cover all treaty jurisdictions. If an author copyrights his 
or her work in such a jurisdiction, the right holder enjoys copyright 
protection in all signatory countries.71 A goods purchaser should be 
able to resell the goods under the first sale doctrine in any signatory 
jurisdiction. In other words, the copyrighted goods should be able to 
move within the stream of commerce in treaty countries—regardless 
of the premium the right holder received. 
The first version of harmonization provides clear limitations. A 
copyright holder could argue that intellectual property grants the right 
 
69 17 U.S.C. § 104 note (2020) (Key to Symbols: Treaties and Conventions: UCC) 
(“Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Came into force on September 16, 1955. 
United States became a party, effective on that same date.”). 
70 Dr. Silke von Lewinski, The Role and Future of the Universal Copyright 
Convention, COPYRIGHT BULL. (UNESCO), Oct.–Dec. 2006, at 1. 
71 The majority opinion in Impression Products v. Lexmark International compares 
the first sale doctrine to the patent exhaustion doctrine. 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535–
36 (2017). Both doctrines limit the ability of the right holder to control the 
intellectual property embodying good once it reaches the stream of commerce. 
Id. at 1536–37. The majority opinion remarks that “[e]xhaustion does not 
depend on whether the patentee receives a premium for selling in the United 
States, or the type of rights that buyers expect to receive. As a result, restrictions 
and location are irrelevant; what matters is the patentee’s decision to make a 
sale.” Id. at 1538. Extrapolating to copyright, the right holder is not guaranteed a 
U.S. premium but only to receive some form of premium. 
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to stop the movement between borders.72 Because market conditions 
differ substantially, these markets ought to be treated separately.73 
In the textbook market, prices depend on many factors (i.e., 
demand for the product, budget constraint, competition, etc.). 
Therefore, adapting to the market condition ensures that the individual 
self-interests of market participants maximize societal welfare.74 
Without a jurisdictional first sale doctrine, publishers would have to 
use a single price, which could price some consumers out of the 
market in some jurisdictions. 
The second version of harmonization facilitates trade. The 
signatory countries could all decide that the first sale doctrine would 
apply to all goods made in a treaty jurisdiction. The purchasers and 
sellers of goods need not worry about the origin of the product as long 
as it came from a treaty country. Such harmonization would simplify 
the flow of copyrighted goods between signatory countries because 
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers could move their goods between 
signatory jurisdictions without having to obtain an authorization or 
license from the copyright holder. The Kirtsaeng majority opted for 
this approach.75 Under this approach, applying the first sale doctrine 
determination depends on whether the author had benefited (i.e., 
whether the product originated from a treaty country). 
In the Kirtsaeng case, the work was developed and originated in 
the U.S.76 It was then affixed onto paper in Thailand. Both countries 
were signatories to both treaties. So, the copyright holder enjoyed 
protection in both countries. This protection allowed the publisher to 
claim supracompetitive prices in Thailand—even if the publisher could 
have sold the book in the U.S. at a higher price. 
Justice Ginsburg considered the implications of international 
treaties. She pointed out that other countries do not have a first sale 
 
72 Id. at 1535–36. 
73 Id. 
74 This idea that an individual’s self-interest leads to a socially efficient outcome 
was first developed by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. ADAM SMITH, 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 231 (Simon & Brown 2010) (1776). This is now 
referred as the “invisible hand.” Id. 
75 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 530 (2013). 
76 Id. at 527. If the work was not protected in the manufacturing country (e.g., lack 
of copyright system) and the work was then imported to the U.S., the work 
could qualify as pirated. This pirated work could be excluded from the U.S. 
because, in this example, the publisher is never able to reap some benefits from 
his work. Id. at 532–33. 
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doctrine as broad as the U.S. and lamented the adoption of such a 
broad doctrine.77 She argued that the World Trade Organization, the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, and other treaties do not 
create a consensus on the first sale doctrine.78 Therefore, she argued 
that the Court should not interpret the U.S. first sale doctrine to mean 
an international first sale doctrine.79 
Both her dissent and the majority opinion failed to discuss whether 
Thailand had such protection. The presence of such a treaty should 
have been part of the deliberation. Some courts have considered 
international treaties when deciding other issues such as 
infringement.80 The first sale doctrine question should enjoy a similar 
treatment.81 
The next section discusses in more detail the economics of the first 
sale doctrine and its policy implications. 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
This section discusses the impact of the first sale doctrine on the 
incentives of consumers to purchase the copyrighted product and the 
incentives of authors to write books. 
 
A. The First Sale Doctrine and End Users 
The first sale doctrine affects the incentives of wholesalers, 
retailers, and consumers to purchase the product. Wholesalers and 
 
77 Id. at 573–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 574. 
79 Id. at 557. 
80 See InduSoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, No. 13–50042, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014) 
(West) (“We discern no conflict arising out of InduSoft’s copyright infringement 
claims because both Brazil and the United States are signatories of the Universal 
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works. Those agreements commit each country to apply foreign 
copyright law when required.”). 
81 In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court highlighted that the sale was voluntary. The 
Court left open the question of whether the first sale doctrine applies only when 
the benefits are voluntarily extracted (i.e., the copyright holder sold the good at 
the price it wanted in the treaty country) or when the benefits are not voluntarily 
negotiated (i.e., a court ordered the copyright holder to sell its product at a 
specific price). This question remains open for patents and the patent exhaustion 
doctrine as well. 
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retailers buy copyrighted products to resell them for a profit. 
Consumers buy these products to consume and, after consumption, 
they may want to sell the product as well. Their ability to resell these 
copyrighted products depends on whether the good is free of claims.82 
The first sale doctrine ensures that copyrighted goods are free of any 
claims. 
Additionally, besides being free of claims, the first sale doctrine 
decreases transaction costs.83 The doctrine sets the boundaries of 
property rights for each market participant.84 The consumers need not 
contact the copyright holder before selling the good. Thus, the doctrine 
eliminates the need for negotiations and the associated hold-up 
problems.85 
The ability and ease of resale increases consumers’ willingness to 
purchase and pay for the copyrighted good. This greater willingness to 
engage with copyrighted goods benefits the copyright holders. In other 
words, by removing uncertainties (such as competing claims and 
transactions costs), the first sale doctrine indirectly incentivizes 
authors by ensuring consumers are willing to partake in the market for 
copyrighted products. 
 
82 See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale 
Restraints, 1 BYU L. REV. 55 (2014) (discussing how the first sale doctrine 
implication can help circumvent issues of imperfect vertical integration to 
incentivize the efficient use of copyrighted goods by decreasing transaction 
costs). 
83 Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 541–43; see Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright 
Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741 (2015) (discussing the use of the first sale 
doctrine as a means to decrease transaction costs). 
84 Transaction costs play an important role in voluntary transactions. See R. H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“[T]he 
granting of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the 
liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may 
prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market transactions were 
costless.”). The Coase Theorem can be rephrased to say that without transaction 
costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the law. Id. at 12–21. 
Delaminating property rights decreases the transaction costs associated with 
trading goods. Id. It removes uncertainty about the reach of the right holder. Id. 
85 A holdup problem occurs when the right holder leverages its exclusionary rights 
to extract supra-competitive profits from a right user who already invested. 
Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright 
Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 212 (2006) (discussing the 
hold-up problem within the context of second generation works of art). 
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Furthermore, the first sale doctrine ensures that some consumers 
can access the copyrighted product through public lending and 
commercial rentals (e.g., library and rental).86 
The Kirtsaeng majority worried about the welfare of consumers.87 
If the consumers are willing to participate in the market, the authors 
will be incentivized to join and supply copyrighted products. Justice 
Ginsburg, in her dissent, worried more about the incentive created for 
copyright owners.88 She argued that the first sale doctrine is 
unnecessary to reach those efficiencies.89 
Courts (and policymakers) can adjust the breath, depth, and length 
of copyright to reach the correct balance.90 When adjusting these 
dimensions, they have to balance the interest of the copyright holders 
against the interest of copyright users. Benefiting one often harms the 
other. While Justice Ginsburg worried more about the copyright 
holders, the majority worried more about copyright users. Research 
has shown that the optimal mix can be complicated to obtain and 
 
86 R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 
B.C. L. REV. 577, 583–92 (2003) (discussing how the first sale doctrine can 
open access to many users through resale, public lending, etc.). 
87 568 U.S. at 540–41. 
88 Id. at 575 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
89 First, Justice Ginsburg argued the first sale doctrine was overbroad because 
vertical restrictions have procompetitive effects. Id. at 577–78. Second, the 
majority argued that the decreased transaction costs also benefit the judicial 
system. Id. at 538–39 (majority opinion). The first sale doctrine enhances 
judicial efficiencies because courts need not trace the origin of the goods. Justice 
Ginsburg argues that a clear rule that imported goods do not fall under the first 
sale doctrine could reach a similar outcome. Id. at 579–80 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Third, copyright holders have private incentives not to exercise 
control over second markets because consumers would have a lower willingness 
to pay with goods carrying potential copyright claims. Id. at 582–83, 585 n.26. 
See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Determinants of Judicial Efficiency: A Survey, 42 EUR. 
J.L. & ECON 183 (2016) (providing a literature review of the determinants of 
judicial efficiency). 
90 These dimensions have been discussed in detail by scholars. See, e.g., Richard 
Watt, The Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright, 1 REV. ECON. 
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 151 (2004). “Copyright can be defined according to 
1. duration; the length of time for which the legal copyright is enforced, 
2. depth; the particular aspects of the creation that are protected (and 
those that are not), and 
3. breadth; what particular acts are deemed to be copyright infringing (and 
what are not).” Id. at 157. 
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extending copyright does not necessarily lead to more or better work 
product.91 
The same issue could be said of the first sale doctrine. 
Implementing a narrow first sale doctrine, as Justice Ginsburg argued, 
may not lead to more or better works. In fact, it may lead to more 
returns for copyright holders without benefits for copyright users. The 
next section discusses how the first sale doctrine affects copyright 
holders and their incentives. 
 
B. The First Sale Doctrine and Copyright Holders 
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress authority to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”92 To this end, Congress created the copyright 
system. Within this system, copyright grants authors an exclusive right 
to exploit the expression of an idea. Copyright attempts to incentivize 
authors to create original works.93 
The first sale doctrine affects the exploitation rights and the 
associated incentives of a copyright holder in a number of ways. First, 
the first sale doctrine turns every copyrighted product into a durable 
good. Without the first sale doctrine, a consumer would be limited in 
their ability to enjoy the good. The enjoyment would be nominal and 
limited to the first consumer. With the first sale doctrine, a consumer 
 
91 Some scholars have questioned whether these dimensions have been correctly 
set. For example, Michela Giorcelli and Petra Moser tested empirically the 
impact of copyright on the production rate and quality of opera following the 
staggered introduction of copyright in Italy. They found that copyright did 
improve both the rate and quality of operas but moving from a twenty-year 
copyright protection to a thirty-year copyright protection had no impact on 
either dimension. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyrights and Creativity: 
Evidence from Italian Opera 25–28 (May 16, 2019), https://ssrn.com /abstract= 
2505776 [https://perma.cc/922A-65EP]. 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
93 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress 
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
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can legally resell the copyrighted book. Therefore, the right holder 
enters into competition with the first period purchaser. 
A copyright holder can resolve this problem94 without resorting to 
the law. A copyright holder can increase the price of their product in 
period one to capture the monopoly profits of multiple follow-on 
consumers. A copyright holder can use a lease-only business where 
they retain ownership of the copyrighted work and lease its use.95 This 
approach has become more widespread with the vulgarization of 
digital media.96 
Second, the first sale doctrine decreases the right holder’s ability to 
price discriminate.97 Without the first sale doctrine, a right holder 
could charge different prices in different jurisdictions and prevent 
 
94 R. H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON 143 (1972). Coase 
investigated the durable good problem within the monopoly context. Id. at 143. 
He used the example of the monopolist where a durable good is non-
depreciable. Id. He found that the competition from the second-hand market 
drives the price of the good to competitive level even in the first period when 
consumers are willing to temporally displace their consumption. Id. at 143–44. 
The relative mass of impatient and patient consumers affects the willingness to 
pay for the good in the first period: impatient consumers will be willing to pay 
more because they know they can recoup some cost in the second period. See, 
e.g., Nancy L. Stokey, Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing, 12 
BELL J. ECON. 112 (1981) (establishing that the buyers’ expectations depend on 
the stock of the durable good). This problem has been referred as the Coase 
Conjecture. See, e.g., Faruk Gul et. al, Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and 
the Coase Conjecture, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 155, 156 (1986). 
95 See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow, Durable-Goods Monopolists, 90 J. POL. ECON. 314 
(1982) (discussing how monopolists who manufacture durable goods benefit 
more by renting rather than selling the good); Michael Waldman, Eliminating 
the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing, 40 
J.L. & ECON. 61 (1997) (explaining that one way durable goods manufacturers 
use a lease-only policy is to eliminate the market for secondhand goods). 
96 Unsurprisingly, textbook publishers have used digital and rental textbooks to 
attempt to keep control of their copyright. According to a report from 2017/2018 
by the National Association of College Stores (“NACS”), 45% of students have 
rented one or more textbooks. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. STORES, HIGHLIGHTS 
FROM STUDENT WATCH ATTITUDES & BEHAVIORS TOWARD COURSE MATERIALS 
2017-18 REPORT, https://www.nacs.org/research/studentwatchfindings.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/D5VM-7YA8] [hereinafter, NACS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
STUDENT WATCH]. In the same report, NACS also found 25% of students 
bought digital versions of their textbooks. Id. These methods avoid putting 
durable goods on the market that compete with the right holder. 
97 Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications 
for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1374–75 (1998) (describing every 
intellectual property right as a tool to price discriminate). 
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arbitrage.98 With the first sale doctrine, a low-value consumer can 
resell to a high-value consumer. The resale prevents the right holder 
from collecting high premiums. The price discrimination (and its 
absence) has ambiguous price and welfare effects.99 This issue is 
discussed in more detail in section IV.A. 
Third, the first sale doctrine eliminates the right holder’s ability to 
dictate vertical restrictions on the retailer based on copyright grounds. 
For example, the right holder cannot use copyright to dictate the resale 
price to consumers.100 Resale price maintenance has ambiguous 
welfare effects.101 But, it always decreases the intra-brand competition 
and likely increases prices.102 Resale price maintenance and other 
vertical restrictions are, however, not barred.103 The first sale doctrine 
prevents the right holder from using copyright law to justify these 
vertical restrictions,104 which are better dealt with through contract 
law.105 
 
98 “Effective price discrimination requires satisfaction of three conditions: (1) the 
seller has market power; (2) the seller can sort customers according to their 
preferences; and (3) customers cannot arbitrage away price differentials.” 
Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright 
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 850 (1997). 
99 See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. 
ECON. REV. 870 (1985) (discussing how, in a simplified model, allowing price 
discrimination can increase social welfare). 
100 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
101 Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price 
Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 370–71 (1985). 
102 Id. at 372. 
103 Resale price maintenance can violate the antitrust laws under a rule of reason. 
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007). 
Other vertical restrictions can also violate the antitrust laws (e.g., territorial 
restraints). See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.17 (1977). 
104 In the textbook industry, publishers still frequently implement resale price 
maintenance. For example, the United States v. Apple case involved an antitrust 
violation where six publishers colluded to change the e-book pricing model from 
a wholesale model where the retailers could price at will once they acquire the 
book to an agency model where the publishers retain control over the price. 791 
F.3d 290, 327 (2d Cir. 2015). The agency model artificially created a resale 
price maintenance by being combined with a most favored nation clause. Id. at 
304. 
105 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 552–53 (2013). The Court 
considered contract law better situated to deal with restrictions such as territorial 
restrictions. Id. 
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The Kirtsaeng Court argued that the doctrine encourages 
competition at the retail level.106 The resale price maintenance 
discussed in Bobbs-Merrill and the territorial restrictions discussed in 
Quality King and Kirtsaeng aim at decreasing intra-brand 
competition.107 
Intra-brand competition occurs when different distributors of the 
same (copyrighted) products compete for the same consumers.108 The 
first sale doctrine encourages resellers to compete over price. If the 
consumers value lower prices, they will benefit from the first sale 
doctrine;109 but if they value the additional services associated with the 
product (e.g., the ability to exchange the product), then allowing 
vertical restraints may benefit societal welfare.110 
In the textbook case, consumers usually place price first111 because 
teachers select textbooks whereas students pay for the textbooks.112 
Students are more price sensitive than teachers and they do not value 
 
106 Id. at 539. 
107 Intra-brand competition is facilitated by barring vertical restraint; however, 
intra-brand can be considered procompetitive. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The 
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 
48 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9 (1981) (arguing that vertical restriction should be per 
se legal based on efficiency reasons and that “territorial restriction affects both 
price and service competition; the [resale] price restriction affects only price 
competition.”). 
108 See Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 
108 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1993) (modeling intra-brand competition and finding that if 
a large proportion of consumers values low prices over services, retailers will 
overemphasize price competition and underemphasize service competition 
relative to the efficient levels). 
109 Id. at 63. 
110 Id. at 63–64. 
111 The textbook market suffers from the principal-agent problem because the 
purchase decisionmaker differs from the cost bearer. Principal-agent problems 
are a version of the moral hazard problem. See Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmström, 
The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFTH WORLD 
CONGRESS 75–76 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). 
112 Although surveyed teachers considered the cost of the material in their material 
selection, only 12% considered it to be the most important factor in their 
material selection decision. NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLL. STORES, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
FACULTY WATCH ATTITUDES & BEHAVIORS TOWARD COURSE MATERIALS 
2016-17 REPORT (2017), http://www.nacs.org/research/FacultyWatchKey 
Findings2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/VT2D-PQA6]. 
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additional services as much.113 Students could benefit from barring 
vertical restraints. 
The Kirtsaeng decision made third degree price discrimination 
more difficult. The next section discusses whether it benefitted 
American textbook consumers. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF KIRTSAENG ON THE PRICE OF TEXTBOOKS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The Kirtsaeng ruling made price discrimination more difficult. 
This section first discusses how publishers can react to facing more 
arbitrage. This section then tests whether this decision had any effect 
on the pricing behavior of textbook publishers. 
 
A. Third Degree Price Discrimination 
Third degree price discrimination114 refers to the practice of 
charging different prices to different consumers based on observable 
characteristics. As Justice Ginsburg explained: “Because economic 
conditions and demand for particular goods vary across the globe, 
copyright owners have a financial incentive to charge different prices 
for copies of their works in different geographic regions.”115 In 
Kirtsaeng, the publisher requested the ability to engage in 
geographical price discrimination. But “[t]heir ability to engage in 
such price discrimination, however, is undermined if arbitrageurs are 
permitted to import copies from low-price regions and sell them in 
high-price regions.”116 
 
113 In 2017-18, 63% of surveyed students purchased their textbooks new and 56% 
of surveyed students purchase used textbooks. NACS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
STUDENT WATCH, supra note 96. 
114 Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, struggled to define 
price discrimination. “Roughly, it can be said that the producer price-
discriminates when two units of the same physical good are sold at different 
prices, either to the same consumer or to different consumers.” JEAN TIROLE, 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 (2d. ed. 1989). 
115 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 557 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
116 Id. at 557–58. 
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From a legal standpoint, price discrimination rarely raises a 
competition problem.117 From a policy standpoint, the Justices have to 
balance the interests of the end-user and the copyright owners. 
From a societal welfare analysis standpoint, price discrimination 
has ambiguous effects. Price discrimination can increase societal 
welfare. It can be used to cross-subsidize between consumers. These 
cross-subsidies can increase welfare when compared to a market 
without price discrimination.118 
 
117 Most forms of price discriminations do not raise legal issues. The Clayton 
Antitrust Act of 1914 prohibits the discrimination “in price between different 
purchasers . . . substantially to lessen competition.” Pub. L. No 63-212, § 2, 38 
Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C § 13 (2012)). For the most part, 
it remains legal if it has no impact on competition (e.g., volume discounts 
available to all consumers) or unenforced because parties struggle to prove 
competitive effects. That is why most of the enforcement of § 2 of the Clayton 
Act has focused on predatory pricing. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The 
Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for 
Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1262–71 (2010) (discussing the 
diminished enforcement of price discrimination in the U.S.). Similarly, most 
third-degree price discriminations do not raise legal issues either. Some forms of 
price discrimination based on protected classes raise legal issues. For example, 
offering different classes based on gender or ethnicity (e.g., offering different 
wages) raises legal problems under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which amended 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
38, § 3, 52 Stat. 1062; 63 Stat. 912 (1963). In the copyright context, copyright 
holders are, in theory, able to enjoy a monopoly over their work. However, this 
monopoly is not without limitation. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) published their latest 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Jan. 12, 2017). In these guidelines, the antitrust 
authorities explain how copyright can be used to limit competition, and can be 
found unlawful under a rule of reason. Id. at 6, 16–17. At the international level, 
geographical price discrimination can raise trade violation concerns: dumping. 
Richard I. Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Discovery of the 
Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT’L LAW. 227, 227 (1977). The pricing 
threshold to trigger dumping liability is lower than the predatory pricing 
threshold under antitrust laws. Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of 
Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 409, 410–12 (1987) (comparing predatory pricing under the Robinson-
Patman Act and anti-dumping regulations and arguing that dumping can be 
easier to prove because dumping does not require below-cost sales or intent). In 
Kirtsaeng, it is unclear whether moving the textbook can raise dumping 
concerns—the product would still be sold at a higher price in the U.S. than in 
Thailand but below the U.S. manufacturing cost. The parties did not raise these 
issues. 
118 Varian, supra note 99, at 870–71. 
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For example, assume that the market is composed of 100 
consumers with a high valuation of the good, $10, and 100 consumers 
with a low valuation, $5. To make a good, a company must incur $4 
marginal cost per textbook and a fixed cost of $300. If the company 
can price discriminate and avoid arbitrage, then it can charge $10 to 
100 high-valuation consumers and $5 to 100 low-valuation consumers. 
The company would collect $1,500 in revenues, incur $1,100 in costs, 
and raise $400 in profits. If it cannot price discriminate, it must decide 
between pricing at $10 and selling to 100 consumers or pricing at $5 
and selling to 200 consumers. At $10, the company brings $1,000 in 
revenues and incurs $700 in costs whereas at $5, it brings $1,000 
revenues and incurs $1,100 in costs. Therefore, the company would be 
better off pricing to the high-valuation consumers and avoid selling to 
low-valuation consumers altogether. Profits would be $300. In this 
case, the societal welfare would increase if the company was able to 
price discriminate.119 
However, price discrimination can also decrease societal welfare. 
Assume that the company must pay $100 to maintain two prices and 
the low valuation increases to $8. With price discrimination, the 
company makes $600 charging $10 to high-valuation consumers and 
$8 to low-valuation consumers. Without price discrimination, the 
company makes $500 if it caters to both low and high types and $300 
if it only caters to high types. Thus, the company would prefer to cater 
to both types of consumers because it makes more profits. However, 
society would be better off if it could not price discriminate because 
societal welfare would be $700 ($500 in profits and $200 in consumer 
welfare) as compared to $600 with price discrimination ($600 in 
profits). In this case, the societal welfare would decrease if the 
company was able to price discriminate. 
This stylized example demonstrates how price discrimination can 
affect societal welfare. These examples use two consumer types with 
flat willingness to pay. However, demand is usually composed of more 
consumer types, which makes the effect of price discrimination even 
harder to generalize. 
 
119 Societal welfare would be greater under a price discrimination scenario ($400) 
as compared to no price discrimination ($300). Societal welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. In this example, consumer surplus is 
zero under both scenarios because the company sets the prices at the consumers’ 
willingness to pay; therefore, consumers receive no gains from consumption. So, 
producer surplus (i.e., profits) equals societal welfare. 
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More generally, when arbitrage restricts price discrimination, 
companies can react in three ways. First, they can decide to only sell to 
high-valuation consumers. Low-valuation consumers (i.e., foreign 
consumers) are priced out of the market. Here, societal welfare usually 
decreases because the profit from selling to low-valuation consumers 
and the corresponding consumer surplus disappear. The company can 
also increase the price because it need not worry about arbitrage with a 
single price. Such a price increase further decreases societal welfare 
because the high-valuation consumers’ consumer surplus would 
decrease more than profits would increase. 
Second, the company may decide to sell to both types. This 
decreases the price for the high-valuation consumers. If the price 
decreases post-prohibition, societal welfare increases because more 
consumers (i.e., those in the U.S.) can afford the good. 
Finally, the publisher (using the textbook market as an example) 
can decide to price the textbook at a value between the two prices 
selected under price discrimination. Within some countries, the 
quantity demanded decreases as a function of the willingness to pay.120 
Thus, pricing in between may be profitable depending on the elasticity 
of the demand in each region. If the publisher adopts this strategy, the 
price decreases in one geographic region while it increases in the 
other. 
However, even if the first sale doctrine enables arbitrage, the 
company can still price differently between the two countries. For 
example, the U.S. price could still reflect the Thailand price plus the 
transport cost and other transaction costs (e.g., import duties). 
The next section tests whether publishers reacted to the Kirtsaeng 
decision. 
 
B. Impact of Kirtsaeng on the Price of College Textbooks in 
the United States 
This section uses data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(“BLS”).121 The BLS collects data as part of its mission to collect, 
 
120 The stylized example above uses flat willingness to pay (demand). But in 
general, demand is downward sloping within each geographical region. The 
price in each region determines the demand (i.e., budget constraint, taste for 
English language textbook, etc.). 
121 The data was collected as part of the BLS Consumer Price Index program. 
College Tuition and Fees Increase 63 Percent Since January 2006, U.S. 
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/ 
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analyze, and disseminate economic information to support decision-
making.122 The data on textbooks and college tuition is collected to 
calculate the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). The BLS publishes the 
college textbook data from December 2001 to the present.123 The BLS 
publishes the college tuition data from December 1977 to the 
present.124 The data is collected on college textbooks in the U.S. by 
city average for all urban consumers.125 
Figure 1 shows the relative prices of college textbooks, college 
tuition, and the CPI from December 2001 (benchmark 100%) to 
October 2018. Prices increased steadily over this period. By October 
2018, the prices of both college textbooks and college tuition more 
than doubled. The price of textbooks increased more rapidly after the 







122 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2020-2025, 2, 
https://www.bls.gov/bls/bls-strategic-plan-2020-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ68-
7Y7N]. 
123 Data Series CUUR0000SSEA011, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on 
the page; then enter “CUUR0000SSEA011” and click “next”; specify the 
desired year range and click “Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5]. 
124 Data Series CUUR0000SEEB01, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on 
the page; then enter “CUUR0000SEEB01” and click “Next”; specify the desired 
year range and click “Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5]. 
125 “The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the change in prices paid by 
consumers for goods and services. The CPI reflects spending patterns for each 
of two population groups: all urban consumers and urban wage earners and 
clerical workers. The all urban consumer group represents about 93 percent of 
the total U.S. population. It is based on the expenditures of almost all residents 
of urban or metropolitan areas, including professionals, the self-employed, the 
poor, the unemployed, and retired people, as well as urban wage earners and 
clerical workers. Not included in the CPI are the spending patterns of people 
living in rural nonmetropolitan areas, farming families, people in the Armed 
Forces, and those in institutions, such as prisons and mental hospitals. Consumer 
inflation for all urban consumers is measured by two indexes, namely, the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and the Chained 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U).” U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – MAY 2019, https://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/archives/cpi_06122019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K32-BFB3]. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Price of College Textbooks and 




I tested the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision on the price of college 
textbooks. To test this impact, I proceeded in two steps. First, I pooled 
the information provided by the textbook and tuition index and 
attempted to see whether the growth rate of textbook prices changed 
post-Kirtsaeng. In other words, I carried a difference-in-difference for 
the price of textbooks. Second, I estimated whether tuition should be 
used as a control variable. The price of textbooks is likely related to 
tuition as complementary goods. In other words, I used the tuition rate 
as a control variable to see whether the Kirtsaeng decision affected the 
price of textbooks. 
As described, I first tested the following time series relationship: 
𝑔! = 𝛼𝑔!"# + 𝛽𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- + 𝜀!, 
where 𝑔! represents the growth rate of the price of college 
textbooks and tuition at time 𝑡, 𝛼 represents the autoregressive factor, 
the 𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- is a dummy variable that measures the impact of 
the Kirtsaeng decision taking the value “1” of textbook pricing post 
2013 and 𝜀! represents the error term. 𝛽 is the estimator of interest. 
This difference-in-difference estimation allows to test whether only 
textbooks were affected by the decision. 
College tuition should not have been affected by the Kirtsaeng 
decision. College textbooks represent a marginal added cost to 
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education as compared to college tuition. But college tuition and 
college textbooks are probably affected by the same shocks (e.g., 
economic crisis). 𝛽 should be negative if the decision led to more 
arbitrage, as Justice Ginsburg feared. 𝛽 should be positive if the 
publishers reacted by getting rid of price discrimination because of 
potential arbitrage and increasing prices in the U.S. as a consequence 
to capture more profits. 𝛽 should be non-different from zero if the 
decision had no effect. 
Table 1 shows the results of these estimations. Estimation (1) looks 
at the estimation described by the equation above. Estimations (2-6) 
use an interaction variable between the dummy variable and the price 
at 𝑡 − 1 to account for potential non-constant effects. Estimations (3) 
and (5) include a time trend. Estimations (4) and (6) include year 
dummies. 
Estimations (5) and (6) control for the growth rate of median 
weekly and hourly earnings (which data is available quarterly)126 and 
of the CPI.127 Earnings should affect tuition and book prices because 
they affect the ability of students to pay for those goods and services. 
They also affect the outside opportunity of getting a college education. 
The CPI also affects tuition and book prices as universities and book 
publishers should adapt their prices to those changes to keep the real 










126 Data Series LEU0252881500, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ 
data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on the page; then enter 
“LEU0252881500” and click “Next”; specify the desired year range and click 
“Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5]. 
127 Data Series CUSR0000SA0, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data 
(click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on the page; then enter 
“CUSR0000SA0” and click “Next”; specify the desired year range and click 
“Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5]. 
128 Note that the CPI is a composite indicator of which the price of textbooks and 
the tuitions contribute. While these may create some estimation problems, the 
weight attributed to textbooks and tuitions is so small in the CPI basket that it 
should have little influence on the outcome. 
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Table 1: Difference-in-difference regressions of the 
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Standard error in parenthesis 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
Estimations (1-4) show that the prices of textbooks and tuition 
have continued to increase steadily and exponentially over this period. 
Once the growth rates of earnings and of the CPI are introduced in 
estimations (5-6), the growth rates of textbook prices and tuition have 
not followed the same pattern of exponential growth; instead, the 
growth rates have oscillated around zero. 
In estimations (1-4), the post-Kirtsaeng dummy shows that the 
decision has had a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
price of textbooks. Once the growth rate of earnings and CPI has been 
controlled in estimations (5-6), the impact of the decision is positive 
and not statistically different from zero. In other words, the price of 
194 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 166 
textbooks did not grow faster or slower than the price of tuition after 
the Kirtsaeng decision. The year dummies do not return statistically 
significant results. 
As described above, I then used tuition as a control variable 
because college textbooks are a complement to college tuition. When a 
textbook publisher sets their prices, they might consider the price of 
tuition to determine whether to increase textbook prices. Thus, I tested 
the following time series relationship: 
 
𝑔.%%/,! = 𝛼𝑔.%%/,!"# + 𝛾𝑔!1(!(%,,!"# + 𝛽𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- + 𝜀!, 
 
where 𝑔.%%/,! represents the growth rate of the book prices and 
𝑔!1(!(%,,! is the growth rate of tuition at time 𝑡, 𝛼 represents the 
autoregressive factor, the 𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- is a same dummy variable, 
and 𝜀! represents the error term. 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the estimators. 
The estimations in Table 2 show the same estimations as those 
presented in Table 1 using the price of tuition as a control variable. 
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* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
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In all estimations, the Kirtsaeng decision does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the price of textbooks. In estimations 
(1-4), the growth of textbook prices has followed the growth rate of 
tuition. When controlling for earning and CPI growth in estimations 
(5-6), the growth rate of tuition becomes insignificant. Therefore, both 
earnings, CPI, and tuition may be picking up the same effects.129 
Based upon the results from Table 1 and Table 2, the Kirtsaeng 
decision does not have an effect on the growth rate of textbook prices. 
Publishers have continued to increase the price of textbooks in the 
U.S. over this period, but the rate of increase has not been affected by 
the decision. 
In other words, either the publishers increased the prices in foreign 
countries to avoid arbitrage or they ignored Kirtsaeng and kept price 
discriminating because arbitrage remains marginal. Unfortunately, 
without information about the price change pre- and post-Kirtsaeng in 
Thailand, it remains impossible to confirm one of these two 
alternatives theories. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Kirtsaeng decision expanded the first sale doctrine with 
ambiguous effects on the author’s incentives to publish. On the one 
hand, the doctrine makes copyrighted goods more desirable by 
removing uncertainties. On the other hand, authors cannot price 
discriminate geographically, which limits their ability to recoup 
profits. 
However, in the case of textbooks, authors have other incentives to 
write textbooks than monetary rewards. Academic authors value 
publications for prestige or tenure. Therefore, the Kirtsaeng decision 
should not have affected the creation of textbooks but may have 
affected the dissemination. 
The Kirtsaeng decision does not bar price discrimination but 
allows arbitrage.130 Cabolis et al. found that textbooks were more 
 
129 Note that estimation removing the CPI for fear that the CPI picks up the weight 
of the tuition and textbooks in the composite indicator returns similar results. 
130 The Circuit Courts have applied the Kirtsaeng decision to mean that the first 
sale doctrine allows the distribution and importation of copyrighted products 
regardless of where the item was manufactured or first sold. See, e.g., Close v. 
Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2018); Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 793–94 (5th Cir. 2017); Omega 
S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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expensive in the U.S. than in other international markets.131 They did 
not observe the same phenomenon in the general audience book 
markets.132 Malueg and Schwartz have found that if a monopolist does 
not price discriminate, then it often ends up catering to the high-
valuation consumers while foreclosing the low-valuation consumer 
access to the good.133 These studies lend support to the idea that the 
Kirtsaeng decision should lead to an increase in textbook prices in 
Thailand without affecting prices in the U.S. 
Some of Justice Ginsburg’s fears may not have been realized.134 
The decision did not affect the U.S. textbook prices nor the price 
growth rate. Over the period of observation (2001-18), textbook 
publishers, however, have had to deal with other issues (e.g., digital 
duplication and dissemination). Publishers have met these issues head-
on using the same technologies to create new business models (e.g., 
digital publishing, digital rental) that decrease the publishers’ reliance 
on copyright to prevent resale. These technologies have made the first 
sale doctrine almost redundant and could explain why the decision has 
not had any marked effect on price. 
 
 
131 Christos Cabolis et al., A Textbook Example of International Price 
Discrimination, 95 ECON. LETTERS 91, 92 (2007) (finding that general audience 
books are similarly priced internationally but textbooks are more expensive in 
the U.S.). 
132 Id. 
133 David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, 
and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 191 (1994). 
134 For the publisher in Kirtsaeng, John Wiley & Sons, about half of its revenues 
come from foreign sales. From this half, an even smaller fraction comes from 
textbooks sold abroad. The fraction has not changed over the years. See e.g., 
Financial Highlights, JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. (2011), 
https://www.wiley.com/legacy/annual_reports/ar_2011/financial.html 
[https://perma.cc/SMQ2-NFF7]; Financial Highlights, JOHN WILEY & SONS, 
INC. (2010), https://www.wiley.com/legacy/annual_reports/ar_2010/ financial. 
html [https://perma.cc/SR6W-FE3Y]; Wiley Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 
Year 2018 Results, WILEY (June 12, 2018, 8:00 AM), https:// 
newsroom.wiley.com/press-release/all-corporate-news/wiley-reports-fourth-
quarter-and-fiscal-year-2018-results [https://perma.cc/83R4-QQ5J]; Wiley 
Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2017 Results, WILEY (June 13, 2017, 8:00 
AM), http://newsroom.wiley.com/press-release/all-corporate-news/wiley-
reports-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-2017-results [https://perma.cc/WY56-HS7R]. 
